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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1918 James H. Wilkins proudly proclaimed that crime was
on the wane. Speaking at the end of a long career in California's
state prison system, Wilkins had seen the presumed eradication of
the opium habit among State prisoners, the reduction and sup-
posed elimination of corporal punishment in the State's prisons,
and the introduction of the parole system. He wrote:
all this tends to material betterment in the present condition and future out-
look of prison populations .... It is a long cry before our prisons, jails and
other like institutes of detention will bear upon their rusty gates the legend
"closed for want of inmates." But we are heading in the right direction, and
in that direction I trust society will persevere.'
* Professor of History, California State University, San Bernadino. The author would
like to acknowledge the assistance of David Shichor, Professor of Criminal Justice, Califor-
nia State University, San Bernadino.
1. J. WILKINS, EVOLUTION OF A STATE PRISON, HISTORICAL NARRATIVE OF THE TEN YEARS
FROM 1851 TO 1861, DURING THE PERIOD WHEN THE CARE AND EMPLOYMENT OF CONVICTS WAS
TURNED OVER TO LESSEES 94-95 (1918) (manuscript available in Bancroft Library, Univer-
sity of California, Berkeley).
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We, however, live in another time. Today, few share Wilkins'
unabashed optimism for the possibility of reforming America's
prisons and their inhabitants. Far more common now is the con-
cern that past and present experiments in prison reform have
proven too costly. The dominant mood today is that prison man-
agement should be more cost-effective. At a time when all social
services are under review, state prison expenses are experiencing
especially close scrutiny. Within this context, private, for-profit
prisons are viewed as a possible alternative.'
II. THE WISDOM OF CAUTION
Some are as sanguine about the prospects of private prisons
today as Wilkins was about progressive reforms in the early twenti-
eth century. Richard L. Mitchell, who served in New York's De-
partment of Correctional Services in the 1970s, has claimed that a
prison run by private enterprise "should be able to reduce its ad-
ministrative costs by as much as a third."'3 Tennessee has taken
the national lead in moving toward a private, adult, general pur-
pose prison. But wisely, Tennessee has not moved headlong in this
direction. Exercising proper caution, Tennessee enacted the Pri-
vate Prison Act on May 1, 1986, "to contract with private concerns
on a limited basis to afford an opportunity to determine if savings
and efficiencies can be effected for the operation of correctional fa-
cilities."' 4 This Act identified only one correctional facility as a pos-
sible private prison and charged the State's Department of Correc-
tion with inaugurating the process that ultimately could result in a
contract with a private concern for the management and operation
of the facility. 5
Private prisons are not a new idea. In the nineteenth century,
a number of states committed their entire prison systems to pri-
vate entrepreneurs. Kentucky inaugurated the lease system in
2. For an excellent review of the private prison issue in our time, see Corrections and
Privatization: An Overview, 65 PRISON J., Autumn-Winter 1985.
3. Mitchell, A New Idea: Private Enterprise Prisons, L.A. Times, Feb. 7, 1978, at 7,
col. 5.
4. An Act to Enable Contracts with Private Contractors for the Construction, Opera-
tion and Maintenance of Certain Correctional Facilities and the Management of Said Facili-
ties and the Monitoring of Said Contracts, 1986 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 932, at 1208 (hereinaf-
ter Tenn. Private Prison Contracting Act of 1986].
5. Id. § 3(c).
6. Convict labor was leased to private parties in the southern states impoverished by
the Civil War. Many American private prison experiments, however, antedated this experi-
ence. See B. MCKELVEY, AMERICAN PRISONS, A STUDY IN AMERICAN SOCIAL HISTORY PRIOR TO
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1825, followed by Michigan, Missouri, Louisiana, Alabama, Indi-
ana, Illinois, California, Nebraska, Montana, Wyoming, and Ore-
gon.7 Then, as now, the movement was driven by the expectation
that private management would save the states money. In Ne-
braska, however, the experiment was an acknowledged failure.8
Similarly, upon California's resumption of prison control in 1861,
the Governor proclaimed that he would "seriously object ever
again to allow the prison or its management to pass out of the ex-
clusive control of the State."9
This Essay will use perspectives gained from these past exper-
iences with private prisons to examine the 1986 Tennessee Private
Prison Act. This comparison will focus primarily on California's
private prison contracts of the 1850s, although other states' stat-
utes will be referred to as well. In light of this perspective, Tennes-
see's Statute reflects caution and careful concern for the negative
scenarios that could occur. The Statute generally reflects an appre-
ciation of this historical experience because the law responds ap-
propriately in most situations when experience would suggest
caution.
Few states adopting prison privatization in the nineteenth
century seriously considered at the outset that the experiment
might fail. California, which inaugurated privatization within a
year after becoming a state, made no provision for resumption of
state control of the prison prior to termination of the prison con-
tract."0 The California prison contract of 1851 was to run for ten
years. After four years, however, the Legislature and the Governor
of California deemed the experiment a failure and regained control
of the State's only prison under legally questionable circum-
stances.11 After one year of public administration, California con-
1915, at 31-34 (1936) (discussing various convict lease systems adopted prior to the Civil
War).
7. See B. MCKELVEY, supra note 6, at 31-34, 103, 191-92, 195-97, 202-03; J. SELLIN,
SLAVERY AND THE PENAL SYSTEM 142 (1976).
8. B. MCKELVEY, supra note 6, at 196.
9. Annual Message of Governor John G. Downey (Jan. 7, 1861), reprinted in CAL. SEN-
ATE J., 12th Sess. 33 (1861).
10. See An Act Providing for Securing the State Prison Convicts, 1851 Cal. Stat. ch.
114, at 427-30 (passed during the second session of the legislature on April 25, 1851) [here-
inafter Cal. Private Prison Act of 1851].
11. See An Act to Provide for the Government of the State Prison, 1855 Cal. Stat. ch.
224, at 292-96 (passed during sixth session of the legislature on May 7, 1855) [hereinafter
Cal. State Prison Government Act of 1855]; J.M. Estell to Governor Bigler (May 16, 1855),
CAL, SENATE J., 7th Sess. 55 (1856); Governor Bigler to J.M. Estell (May 17, 1855), id.; Gov-
ernor John Bigler's Farewell Address (Jan. 9, 1856), id. at 24.
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cluded that the State was unable to manage the prison in a cost-
effective manner and again turned over its operation to private en-
terprise. Apparently California's legislators were unable to learn
from their own experiences. Again, the California Legislature
drafted an overly optimistic statute devoid of any provision indi-
cating how the State could resume public control if private man-
agement proved unsatisfactory. 2 Subsequently, California paid for
this oversight by incurring years of litigation and costly legal judg-
ments." In contrast, the Tennessee Private Prison Act of 1986 ad-
dresses this point directly. Section 6(1) of the Act stipulates that
"prior to entering a contract. . . .[a] plan shall be developed and
certified by the Governor which demonstrates the method by
which the state would resume control of the prison upon contract
termination."' 4 Ancient Hindu philosophers admired the wisdom
of the elephant who carefully tests whether a path will bear his
weight before traversing it. The Tennessee Statute reflects a simi-
lar caution.
III. THE DESIRABILITY OF BROAD CONSULTATION
The Tennessee Act reflects additional wisdom in establishing a
consultation process for the evaluation and selection of private
prison contract bids. Specifically, the Act requires that four sepa-
rate committees review any request for proposals as well as the
proposed contracts themselves. 15 Clearly, the authors of the Act
foresaw the need for openness in the development of any private
prison contract. California's experience of 130 years ago again
highlights the intelligent drafting of the Tennessee statute. Al-
though the California enabling legislation of 1856 provided for con-
tract approval by the lieutenant governor, comptroller, and trea-
surer, the law did not require consultation concerning the bidding
process or proposed contracts.' As a result, those three officers,
who comprised the Board of Prison Commissioners, kept the pub-
lic uninformed until the board officially approved the contract.
Consequently, rumors circulated that the bidding process had not
been truly competitive and that other entrepreneurs were willing
12. See An Act Creating a Board of State Prison Commissioners and Defining Their
Duties, 1856 Cal. Stat. ch. 38, at 48-49 (passed during the seventh session of the legislature
on March 21, 1856) [hereinafter Cal. Private Prison Act of 1856].
13. J. WILKINS, supra note 1, at 70-82.
14. Tenn. Private Prison Contracting Act of 1986, supra note 4, § 6(1).
15. Id. § 4(a)(2).
16. See Cal. Private Prison Act of 1856, supra note 12.
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to manage a private prison for far less remuneration than contrac-
tually provided.1"
The California enabling legislation was passed on March 21,
1856. The prison contract was finalized within the following week.
This secretive and hasty action resulted in an immediately suspect
contract and insured that the lease would be politically controver-
sial.18 The open and deliberative process of contract negotiation re-
quired under the Tennessee Act portends a different result. This
negotiation process ensures that a private prison contract will ben-
efit from broad consultation and therefore not be a source of later
political controversy.
IV. THE NEED TO ASSESS THE HIDDEN COSTS OF PRIVATE PRISON
MANAGEMENT
State monitoring is one of the hidden costs of privately man-
aged prisons.1" Kentucky realized the need for state monitoring as
early as 1825. In legislation passed that year, Kentucky provided
for an inspection board to visit the privately run state prison "at
least once in each month" and report to the legislature on "the
health of the convicts," their diet, the cleanliness of their living
facilities, and their treatment in general.2 0 Missouri's private
prison law of 1843 also provided for state supervision, but failed to
specify the manner of its execution.2 Perhaps the statute's lack of
specificity later contributed to that State prison system's subpar
reputation throughout the nineteenth century.22
California's legislation was far worse than that of Missouri,
which at least provided for paid prison inspectors.23 California's
first prison contract called for state inspectors, but made no men-
tion of their compensation.2 Thereafter, California fluctuated be-
tween paying these inspectors and expecting them to serve without
17. Sacramento Daily Union, Mar. 26, 1856, at 2, col. 1; San Francisco Daily (Alta,
California), Mar. 27, 1856, at 2, col. 4.
18. J. WILKINS, supra note 1, at 55-56.
19. Levinson, Okeechobee: An Evaluation of Privatization in Corrections, 65 PRISON
J., Autumn-Winter 1985, at 89.
20. See An Act Further to Regulate the Penitentiary, 1825 Ky. Acts ch. 115, § 18, at
23 (passed during first session of the legislature on January 10, 1825) [hereinafter Ky. Pri-
vate Prison Act of 1825].
21. See An Act to Lease the Penitentiary, 1843 Mo. Laws § 4, at 95-99 (passed during
first session of the assembly on January 26, 1843) [hereinafter Mo. Private Prison Act of
1843].
22. B. McKELVEY, supra note 6, at 32.
23. See Mo. Private Prison Act of 1843, supra note 21, § 29.
24. See Cal. Private Prison Act of 1851, supra note 10, §§ 6-7.
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remuneration." Eventually, systematic state supervision was elimi-
nated in California's private prison experiment as an unnecessary
expense. This decision was myopic because privatization will fail
without regular state inspection. Regular inspections not only keep
private lessees "honest," but they also keep the public informed of
prison conditions under private management. In California's pri-
vate prison experiment, which often lacked meaningful state super-
vision, rumor frequently influenced public policy more than fact.
The 1986 Tennessee Act provides for state monitoring of pri-
vate prison contracts but leaves the exact nature of that state su-
pervision somewhat vague. Under section 4(c), several state offi-
cials involved in corrections and state finance will determine the
likely cost of state supervision, which will be borne by the leasing
party.26 Section 5(f) suggests that this state monitoring could in-
volve "the Department of Correction or any other state agency." 27
The Act also establishes "the Select Oversight Committee on Cor-
rections" as the authority on questions relating to the quality of
services that the private prison lessee provides. 8 The Act does not
contain an adequate provision for systematic supervision. Presum-
ably, this provision will appear in the private prison contract.
The California enabling legislation of 1856 was far more spe-
cific than the 1986 Tennessee Act on the question of state supervi-
sion. The California law stipulated that one group of state prison
monitors would live at the prison and make recommendations for
improvement to the Board of Prison Commissioners, who had
broad authority to make all rules and regulations governing the
privately managed state prison."' In theory, the system appeared
very thorough. In operation, however, the system fell apart. Within
a year, the legislature eliminated the daily monitors as an unneces-
sary expense. In addition, the Board of Prison Commissioners was
distracted by a state budgetary crisis that led to the impeachment
25. See An Act to Provide for the Payment of State Prison Inspectors, 1852 Cal. Stat.
ch. 16, at 53 (passed during third session of the legislature on May 3, 1852); An Act to
Repeal "An Act to Provide for the Payment of State Prison Inspectors," 1853 Cal. Stat. ch.
172, at 167 (passed during the fourth session of the legislature on May 12, 1853); An Act to
Provide for the Payment of State Prison Inspectors, 1855 Cal. Stat. ch. 172, at 213 (passed
during sixth session of the legislature on April 30, 1855); An Act to Abolish the Office of
Director of the State Prison, 1857 Cal. Stat. ch. 79, at 74-75 (passed during eighth session of
the legislature on March 10, 1857).
26. Tenn. Private Prison Contracting Act of 1986, supra note 4, §§ 4(c)(1)(B)-(C), 5(f).
27. Id. § 5(f).
28. Id. § 5(e).
29. See Cal. Private Prison Act of 1856, supra note 12, at §§ 1, 3-4.
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and resignation of one of its members30 In short, all state oversight
ended in California in 1857. Tennessee's current lack of detailed
description of supervision does not mean that effective state moni-
toring will not be forthcoming, anymore than California's elaborate
provisions guaranteed satisfactory results. Nevertheless, the issue
of adequate state supervision is something that should draw public
attention when actual contracts are reviewed.
At the heart of California's oversight problems was a relatively
deepseated attitude that prison oversight could occur without
much, if any, cost to the State. In acknowledging that state super-
vision will be a cost included in the budget of any private prison,
the Tennessee Act avoids this naive attitude. The Tennessee Act
also alticipates court settlement costs from liability judgments
against a private lessee.3 1 No meaningful comparison can be drawn
between the California statute and the Tennessee Act in this re-
gard because the civil rights of prisoners were virtually nonexistent
in the nineteenth century. In California's private prison experi-
ment, convicts were treated as subhuman. Yet not even the most
ardent critics of that system argued that the abused prisoners pos-
sessed legal rights.
V. THE NEED FOR ANNUAL COST ADJUSTMENTS
In 1831 and 1832, Gustave de Beaumont and Alexis de Toc-
queville visited the United States to investigate America's prisons.
In their subsequent study, de Beaumont and de Tocqueville noted
that American state-run prisons invariably made short-term con-
tracts with private entrepreneurs involving prison labor. De Beau-
mont and de Tocqueville wrote:
Particular care is taken never to make contracts for any great length of time.
The contractors, therefore, cannot exact contracts disadvantageous to the
prison, under the pretense of injurious contingencies to which the possible
depreciation of the manufactured articles may expose them. The duration of
a contract often does not exceed a year; it is sometimes of less duration for
the labor, and generally of six months only for the food.32
The authors' comments were restricted to the contract system
practiced by many states at that time. Under the contract system,
30. See Report of the Special Senate Comm. on State Debt, CAL. SENATE J., app., 8th
Sess. 3-4 (1857); Report of the Assembly Comm. on Accounts and Expenditures, Cal. As-
SEMBLY J., app., 8th Sess. 3-8 (1857).
31. Tenn. Private Prison Contracting Act of 1986, supra note 4, § 7(a)(2).
32. G. DE BEAUMONT & A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, ON THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM IN THE
UNITED STATES AND ITS APPLICATION IN FRANCE 110-11 (S. Univ. Ill. Press ed. 1964) (origi-
nally published 1833).
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state-run prisons made specific, limited contracts with business-
men for convict labor. The authors made no mention of the more
comprehensive lease system, whereby entire prisons or prison sys-
tems were contracted to private entrepreneurs. During de Beau-
mont's and de Tocqueville's stay, however, only the State of Ken-
tucky had any experience with the lease system of prison
operation, which today is called privatization. The introduction of
the private prison concept tended to erode the use of short-term
prison labor contracts previously praised by the French authors.3
The Kentucky private prison contract of 1825 was seven years
in duration with no stipulation for revision short of outright termi-
nation by the State 4 In other states, the lease term was even
longer. Both Missouri's private prison contract of 1843 and Califor-
nia's contract of 1851 were to extend for ten years.3 5 These long-
term contractual provisions bred dissatisfaction both on the part of
the state and the private lessee because its length made the con-
tractual obligations overly vague. This problem encouraged Cali-
fornia to nullify illegally its contract of 1851 after only four years.3
In 1856 California entered into a second private prison contract
that provided for monthly payments of 10,000 dollars to be made
to the lessee over a five year term.37 Changing business conditions
quickly persuaded state officials that the 10,000 dollar sum was
twice as high as it should have been. This perception bred wide-
spread disenchantment with the private prison contract and priva-
tization in general2 8
In the nineteenth century the lessee's initial capital outlay jus-
tified long-term leases. The Tennessee Act of 1986 envisions a
lessee assuming the management of an existing state facility. Con-
sequently, no substantial initial capital outlay is anticipated. In
this respect, the Tennessee Act integrates the brief and amendable
contractual term, long ago applauded by de Beaumont and de Toc-
queville, with the prison lease concept.3 " By allowing both parties
to make necessary adjustments to the contract the Tennessee Act
33. See infra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
34. See Ky. Private Prison Act of 1825, supra note 20, § 2.
35. See Mo. Private Prison Act of 1843, supra note 21, § 1; Cal. Private Prison Act of
1851, supra note 21, § 3.
36. See Cal. State Prison Government Act of 1855, supra note 11.
37. Cal. Private Prison Contract of 1856, reprinted in Report of the Joint Committee
on State Prison Affairs, CAL. SENATE J., App., 9th Sess. 13-16 (1858) [hereinafter Cal. Pri-
vate Prison Contract of 1856].
38. See CAL. ASSEMBLY J., 8th Sess. 748 (1857).
39. See Tenn. Private Prison Contracting Act of 1986, supra note 4, §§ 3(c), 4(b)(1).
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lays the foundation for a successful contractual relationship.
States considering private prison contracts that require large
initial capital expenditures by the lessee should proceed with cau-
tion. States should be wary of contracts that combine both the
construction and subsequent management of private prisons be-
cause these contracts too easily breed misunderstanding. Califor-
nia's experience can be useful in this regard. That State's private
prison contracts of the 1850s were risky ventures. At the outset,
each party hoped to get the better of the bargain. As one side be-
gan to be the loser in this contractual contest, recriminations, deni-
als, and self-righteousness followed. Contracts that do not allow for
annual cost adjustments to accommodate the legitimate needs of
both parties do not foster cooperative behavior or an atmosphere
of mutual trust. Tennessee's current law promises to avoid these
problems by encouraging annual cost adjustments in the contract
itself. 40
VI. THE NECESSITY OF AN ESCAPE CLAUSE
Fearful of state legislatures enacting inflationary monetary
policies, the Nation's founding fathers drafted restrictive language
in the Constitution. 41 Article I, section 10, declares "No State
shall. . .pass any. . .Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts. 4
In Fletcher v. Peck43 the Supreme Court interpreted article I to
apply to contracts to which a state itself was a party. In Fletcher,
which involved the Georgia Legislature's nullification of a fraudu-
lent land grant previously made by the State legislature, Chief Jus-
tice Marshall implied that state contracts could be voided by the
legislative process only if the contract so provided.44 Following the
decision, most state legislatures took great care to include escape
clauses in contracts to which the state itself was a party.45 For ex-
40. See, e.g., id. § 4(b)(1).
41. M. JENSEN, THE NEW NATION, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE CON-
FEDERATION, 1781-1789, at xiii, 245-56, 313, 326, 422-28 (1962).
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, ci. 1.
43. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
44. Although Chief Justice Marshall did not address this point directly, it was implicit
in the logic of his decision. If state contracts were binding, then it follows that any provi-
sions for the undoing of the contract were also binding if written into the contract itself. Cf.
Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch), at 135-39 (discussing the binding nature of contracts entered
into by a state and the inability of a state either to rescind or to modify the terms of a valid
contract through subsequent legislation).
45. For telling examples of the extent to which Fletcher necessitated caution by the
state legislature to avoid binding contracts with private entrepreneurs, see W. McAFEE, CAL-
IFORNIA'S RAILROAD ERA, 1850-1911, at 143-44 (1973).
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ample, the Kentucky Legislature wrote a private prison contract in
1825 naming one Joel Scott the lessee "subject, however, to re-
moval by the Legislature, whenever, in their opinion, said Scott
shall fail to manage said institution in such manner as the interest
of the State may require. '46 This provision encouraged the lessee
to be a true state servant rather than merely a profit-seeking en-
trepreneur. The psychological impact of the provision was impor-
tant to successful private prison management.
Missouri's private prison legislation of 1843 was not as concise
and provided for an elaborate system of arbitration between the
State and the lessee in the event of a dispute.47 California's prison
contracts of 1851 and 1856 were even worse. In the 1856 contract
no mention was made of the State's role in resolving potential dis-
putes.48 When California decided in 1855 that private prison man-
agement was a scandal that no longer could be endured, legislation
was passed returning control of the prison to the State.49 Despite
the Fletcher decision, the lessee decided not to litigate this dis-
pute, but chose instead to devote his energies to bringing about
political change in California.5" Within a year, a new governor and
legislature adopted a new, far more lucrative prison contract, to
which the previous lessee was the sole beneficiary. This new con-
tract also was silent on the State's ability to resolve any future
contractual dispute."'
Within two years, the California Legislature again was dissat-
isfied with private prison management and passed legislation re-
turning the prison to state control.5 2 This time, the lessee took the
issue to court, which resulted in three separate decisions by the
California Supreme Court.5 3 In McCauley v. Weller54 the State ar-
gued that prior practice, unresisted by the lessee in 1855, validated
state seizure in 1858. The court, however, held that the lessee's
46. Ky. Private Prison Act of 1825, supra note 20, § 2.
47. Mo. Private Prison Act of 1843, supra note 21, §§ 15-16.
48. See Cal. Private Prison Act of 1851, supra note 10; Cal. Private Prison Contract of
1856, supra note 37.
49. See Cal. State Prison Government Act of 1855, supra note 11.
50. See Sacramento Daily Union, Feb. 5, 1857, at 3, col. 2.
51. See Cal. Private Prison Act of 1856, supra note 12; Cal. Private Prison Contract of
1856, supra note 37.
52. An Act to Provide for the Temporary Government of the State Prison, and to
Appropriate Money Therefore, 1858 Cal. Stat. ch. 43, at 32-33 (passed during the ninth
session of the legislature on February 26, 1858).
53. See McCauley v. Brooks, 16 Cal. 11 (1860); State v. McCauley, 15 Cal. 430 (1860);
McCauley v. Weller, 12 Cal. 500 (1959).
54. 12 Cal. 500 (1859).
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contract could only be voided by judicial determination.5 Accord-
ing to one judge "[t]he legislature cannot take upon itself, nor the
officers of the government upon themselves, to adjudge what right
has accrued to the State, and then proceed to enforce it, anymore
than a private citizen. ' 6 The next year in State v. McCauley, the
court held that the State had violated the lessee's contractual
rights by seizing the prison. 8 The court also held that constitu-
tionally the State may delegate its police power to manage prisons
to a private lessee. 9 In the end, California was forced to buy out
the lessee's contractual rights for 275,000 dollars.6 0
Later in the nineteenth century, Nebraska also had a disas-
trous experiment with private prison management. 1 Nebraska's
enabling legislation made no mention of the State's power to nul-
lify the contract.6 2 Accordingly, the issue was left to the courts and,
once again the state purchased the lessee's rights. Tennessee
avoids a possible recurrence of this problem by including an escape
clause in its Private Prison Act of 1986. Section 4(a)(4) states:
"Proposer must agree that the state may cancel the contract at any
time after the first year of operation, without penalty to the state,
upon giving ninety (90) days written notice. '63
VII. THE NEED FOR STATE CONTROL OVER CONVICT LABOR
The 1986 Private Prison Act amends the Tennessee Code to
allow convict labor to manufacture goods for sale on the open mar-
ket, provided there is no detrimental effect on free labor in Ten-
nessee.6 4 Private prisons long have been associated with the use of
convict labor for profit. For example, the lessee under Kentucky's
private prison law of 1825 was allowed one-half of the net profits
derived from convict labor.6 5 Under the Missouri law of 1843, the
55. Id. at 533 (Field, J., concurring).
56. Id.
57. 15 Cal. 43 (1860).
58. Id. at 457-59.
59. Id. at 455.
60. See Reports of the Board of Commissioners and Board of Directors of the State
Prison, CAL. SENATE J., app., 12th Sess. 24-26 (1861).
61. See B. MCKELVEY, supra note 6, at 196.
62. An Act Establishing a Board of Public Lands and Buildings of the State of Ne-
braska, and Defining Their Duties, 1877 Neb. Laws §§ 1, 17, at 188-94 (passed during the
fourteenth session of the legislature on February 13, 1877) [hereinafter Neb. Private Prison
Act of 1877].
63. Tenn. Private Piison Contracting Act of 1986, supra note 4, § 4 (a)(4).
64. Id. § 16.
65. Ky. Private Prison Act of 1825, supra note 20, § 12.
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lessees reaped all the profits of convict labor with the restriction
that no work occur beyond the prison walls.6 Nebraska's enabling
legislation granted the lessees all the profits from prison labor
without restricting where that work could take place.6 7 California
went even further. Section 7 of the Private Prison Act of 1851 ex-
plicitly stated: "[T]his Act shall not be so construed as to confine
the labor of the prisoners within the walls of said prison, or to any
particular place or labor."6 8 The 1856 contract noted that the
lessee "shall have the privilege, and be at full liberty to work said
state prison convicts at any and all mechanical branches of busi-
ness that he may choose," which the lessee interpreted as the right
to work convicts outside the prison walls.6 9
The lessee under California's private prison contract fre-
quently worked convicts in locations far from the state prison,
which made escape prevention virtually impossible. The result was
a serious breach in the lessee's contractual obligation to maintain
prison security. In spite of the complaints against publicly run
prisons, the escape prevention record of public prisons is excellent.
By contrast, California's private prison suffered sixty-five escapes
in 1856, seventy-two in 1857, twenty-three in 1858 when the prison
temporarily returned to state control, and ninety-five in 1859 when
again it returned to private management. ° When the goals of
prison security and profitability were in conflict, the lessee always
chose the latter. This, more than any other factor, undermined
California's willingness to experiment with privatization.
The Tennessee Private Prison Act of 1986 specifically denies
the lessee the right to approve the type of work inmates may per-
form, and the wages or sentence credits which may be given to in-
mates engaging in such work.71 The Commissioner of the State
Corrections Department maintains this authority. This retention
of state authority undoubtedly lessens the profit motive of the
lessee but keeps prison security issues entirely under state con-
trol.7 2 Tennessee Corrections Department officials certainly will
never sanction the kind of uses of prison labor that marred the
66. Mo. Private Prison Act of 1843, supra note 21, § 4.
67. Neb. Private Prison Act of 1877, supra note 62, § 17.
68. Cal. Private Prison Act of 1851, supra note 10, § 7.
69. "Supplementary Agreement" to Cal. Private Prison Contract of 1856, supra note
37, at 16.
70. Report of Joint Standing Comm. on State Prisons, CAL. SENATE J., app., 11th Sess.
12 (1860).
71. Tenn. Private Prison Contracting Act of 1986, supra note 4, § 10(4).
72. Id. §§ 4(a)(4), 5(e).
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California experiment. For this reason, the inclusion of a provision
in Tennessee's first lease agreement prohibiting the employment of
convict labor outside the prison may be redundant. Nevertheless,
this restriction would emphasize the value that society places on
prison security.
VIII. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
This Essay suggests that, in light of past experiments with
prison privatization, Tennessee's Private Prison Act of 1986 is, by
and large, an effective piece of legislation. Nevertheless, the ena-
bling legislation is only half of the contractual picture. The method
of effective state oversight and the appropriate uses of convict la-
bor should be included in the final contract. Other issues also may
need to be addressed in the contract itself. Specifically, who will
have the responsibility for building modification, construction, or
the erection of machinery within the prison? And who will own
these improvements? The Kentucky law of 1825 stipulated that
any improvements made by the lessee became the property of the
State upon the expiration of the lease. 3 Missouri's 1843 statute
included a similar provision.u California's 1851 law implied that
the State would be responsible for constructing all permanent
buildings.75 The 1856 California legislation and subsequent con-
tract required the lessee to assume responsibility for all construc-
tion mandated by state officials, with the proviso that all additions
would become state property.76 The Nebraska statute of 1877 as-
sumed that no construction would be necessary under the lease.77
The Tennessee Act is silent on the issue of responsibility for con-
struction, remodeling and unforeseen maintenance costs beyond
normal wear and tear. The title of the Tennessee Act states that
contracts for private construction of state prisons may be author-
ized under the Act.78 The text of the legislation, however, does not
reveal who bears responsibility for any necessary construction. Pre-
sumably, this obligation will be settled under the terms of the spe-
cific lease.
The nineteenth century Missouri and California legislation
73. Ky. Private Prison Act of 1825, supra note 20, § 9.
74. Mo. Private Prison Act of 1843, supra note 21, § 25.
75. Cal. Private Prison Act of 1851, supra note 10, § 3.
76. Cal. Private Prison Act of 1856, supra note 12, § 2; Cal. Private Prison Contract of
1856, supra note 37, at 15.
77. Neb. Private Prison Act of 1877, supra note 62, § 17.
78. Tenn. Private Prison Contracting Act of 1986, supra note 4.
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also required the lessee to post a substantial bond to ensure faith-
ful performance of its contractual obligations." The Kentucky and
Nebraska statutes were silent on this issue as is the 1986 Tennes-
see Act. The requirement under the Tennessee Act that the con-
tractor provide "an adequate plan of insurance" might be con-
strued, however, as being similar to the nineteenth century bond
requirement.8 0
Of the states reviewed here, only Kentucky established a mini-
mum number of guards to be employed at the privately run prison.
The Kentucky law also required state approval of every guard em-
ployed by the lessee."1 The absence of such concerns in the Califor-
nia contracts resulted in the lessee cutting the number of guards
below the level generally considered necessary for adequate prison
security.8 2 Yet, the lack of a numerical quota in the Tennessee Act
should not be regarded as a flaw. Section 6(2) of the Act requires
the Commissioner of the Department of Correction to certify that
the standards for security at Tennessee's privately run prison will
be "equal or superior" to those operational elsewhere in the State
before the private prison contract can be finalized.83 This is per-
haps sufficient protection and is more flexible than a numerical
standard.
One final factor needs to be addressed. The principal Califor-
nia prison lessee of the 1850s was a man of immense political abil-
ity who often used his talents for personal gain. s4 The lessee
helped elect and defeat governors and was regularly a member of
the State legislature.8 5 The potential for abuse of the political pro-
cess by those with an economic interest in private prison manage-
ment suggests that limitations upon the lessee's political activities
should be considered in the drafting of any modern contract.
It is hoped that some practical result might come from this
venture into applied history. The Tennessee Private Prison Act of
1986 generally reflects an understanding of the pitfalls of private
prisons that have been experienced in the past. Whether this un-
79. See Mo. Private Prison Act of 1843, supra note 21, § 6; see also Cal. Private Prison
Act of 1851, supra note 10, § 2; Cal. Private Prison Act of 1856, supra note 12, § 6.
80. Tenn. Private Prison Contracting Act of 1986, supra note 4, § 7(a)(2).
81. Ky. Private Prison Act of 1825, supra note 20, § 7.
82. See California Chronicle (San Francisco), Apr. 1, 1856, at 1, col. 3.
83. Tenn. Private Prison Contracting Act of 1986, supra note 4, § 6(2).
84. J. O'MEARA, BRODERICK AND GwIN, THE MOST EXTRAORDINARY CONTEST FOR A SEAT
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES EVER KNOWN, A BRIEF HISTORY OF EARLY POLITICS IN
CALIFORNIA 113-15 (1881).
85. Id.
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derstanding was acquired through historical research or from
knowledge of comparable modern situations is immaterial. In the
end, all that is required is a statutory foundation that will ade-
quately serve the state during its experiment with private prison
management. Tennessee appears to have accomplished this goal in
its Private Prison Act of 1986.

